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Introduction
Organizations often respond to new institutional demands
by exhibiting symbolic compliance, where they merely
appear to comply (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Zajac and
Westphal 2004, Bromley and Powell 2012). For example,
companies have created their own corporate governance
standards to appear rigorous while avoiding complying
with more stringent standards (Okhmatovskiy and David
2012), developed voluntary self-regulation programs to
forestall the implementation of mandatory ones (Lenox
2006, Glachant 2007, Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010),
and bolstered their social image to shift stakeholder
attention away from areas of criticism (McDonnell and
King 2013). Yet despite much evidence that organizations
often symbolically respond to stakeholder demands, much
less is known about “how, when, and why” they pursue this
strategy (Scott 2001; Bromley and Powell 2012, p. 485).
In this paper we examine selective disclosure, which we
define as a symbolic strategy whereby firms seek to gain
or maintain legitimacy by disproportionately revealing
beneficial or relatively benign performance indicators to
obscure their less impressive overall performance. Prior
research on similar processes has mainly examined how
firms selectively disclose private information to a select
group of people or investors, without simultaneously
disclosing the same information to the public (e.g., Heflin
et al. 2003, Kirk and Vincent 2014). We conceptualize
selective disclosure, by contrast, as a symbolic strategy
whereby firms reveal a subset of private information to cre-
ate a misleadingly positive public impression. Furthermore,
this literature has mainly examined these processes in the
United States, whereas we examine selective disclosure
in a multinational context. This cross-country variation
allows us to better specify and understand the mechanisms
of scrutiny and norm diffusion that limit firms’ symbolic
activity. This is important because, as Scott (2001) notes,
although there are many studies revealing the presence of
symbolic action, few have explored the conditions under
which organizations engage in such activities.
We focus on one type of selective disclosure, a form
of greenwashing whereby companies disclose positive
environmental actions while concealing negative ones
to create a misleadingly positive impression of overall
environmental performance (Lyon and Maxwell 2011).
Such firm-level greenwashing differs from product-level
greenwashing, a common marketing strategy where firms
exaggerate or obfuscate the environmental benefits of
a specific product or service to increase sales (Delmas
and Burbano 2011). Focusing on firm-level selective
information disclosure thus aligns with our broader the-
oretical conceptualization of selective disclosure as a
general corporate symbolic process that also applies to
many other corporate activities such as financial reporting
(Pfeffer 1981, Abrahamson and Park 1994). Moreover,
understanding firm-level selective disclosure is increas-
ingly important given rising demands for organizations to
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exhibit greater accountability and transparency (Power
1994, Bromley and Powell 2012).
We hypothesize and find evidence that several organiza-
tional attributes and institutional mechanisms dissuade
companies from engaging in selective disclosure. Our
model unpacks how particular organizational characteris-
tics, such as environmental damage and foreign exposure,
are likely to increase a company’s exposure to scrutiny
and to global norms of transparency and thus influence its
responsiveness to civil society pressure. We also hypothe-
size that companies causing more environmental damage
will be dissuaded from selective disclosure in institutional
environments in which organized social movements and
public voice are more feasible and that feature more
normative pressure for disclosure resulting from greater
diffusion of environmental information. We test and find
empirical support for our hypotheses using company- and
country-level data to analyze the environmental reporting
practices of 4,750 large publicly traded companies head-
quartered in 45 countries during the years 2004–2007,
a period when firms faced increasing pressure to report
their environmental impacts (KPMG 2008).
Understanding how organizational factors and their
interaction with institutional pressures can deter selective
disclosure has important implications for several liter-
atures. Our results enable researchers to build a more
complete and generalizable theory of organizational sym-
bolic processes, addressing Scott’s (2001) call for a greater
understanding of the determinants of organizational sym-
bolism. Examining how selective disclosure plays out
cross-nationally is particularly timely and important given
Bromley and Powell’s (2012) assertion that the recent
transparency and accountability movements have led to
organizational symbolism being more widely deployed
today than at any time in the past. Going beyond the
existing literature, our research identifies and tests key
institutional processes across different types of political
and economic systems. The institutional variation across
these contexts enables us to better identify the scrutiny
and normative mechanisms we theorize and to reveal how
they actually shape organizational behavior.
Our research also contributes to the literature on infor-
mation disclosure, which has mainly focused on identify-
ing factors that encourage voluntary disclosure rather than
on questioning how accurately the disclosed information
conveys overall performance. Furthermore, our measure
of selective disclosure—which compares firms’ symbolic
transparency with their substantive transparency to esti-
mate the extent to which their disclosure pattern might
mislead stakeholders—goes beyond the prior literature,
which tends to examine either symbolic or substantive
transparency (e.g., Kolk 2004, Marquis and Qian 2014,
Short and Toffel 2008, Reid and Toffel 2009). In doing so,
our work provides a novel approach to understanding this
form of organizational symbolic activity. By empirically
examining the representativeness of firms’ environmen-
tal reporting, we also advance the nascent management
literature on greenwashing (Delmas and Burbano 2011;
Kim and Lyon 2011, 2015; Lyon and Maxwell 2011;
Bowen 2014, Lyon and Montgomery 2015). Finally, given
the growing managerial and governmental interest in
understanding companies’ environmental practices and
performance, our findings have important implications for
practice.
Selective Disclosure in Environmental
Reporting
Companies have faced increasing pressure over the past
decade to report more information about their environ-
mental impacts. A growing number of stakeholders—
including investors, consumers, governments, and corporate
customers—are concerned that assessing organizational
performance requires a more holistic picture than financial
indicators can provide and have increasingly sought to
convince companies to disclose information about their
environmental and social performance (Elkington 1998,
Jira and Toffel 2013). As a result, the number of companies
worldwide that have voluntarily issued corporate environ-
mental or sustainability reports has increased dramatically
since such reports first appeared a quarter century ago. As
of 2013, nearly all of the 100 largest companies in Japan,
Malaysia, Indonesia, South Africa, Denmark, France, and
the United Kingdom had issued environmental reports
and more than 86% of such companies in the United
States had done so (KPMG 2013). Moreover, the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) describes scores of environ-
mental indicators and urges companies to report many of
them. Companies doing so have touted the fact that their
environmental reports have higher GRI “grades.”
An important unresolved question of theoretical and
practical importance is whether the increasing prevalence
of environmental information disclosure is an increase
in actual corporate transparency and accountability or
merely symbolic action. That is, when firms disclose
information about their operations, are they providing
a full and accurate picture or are they selective in the
details revealed to manage audience impression? Research
several decades ago indicated that the corporate strat-
egy of keeping “secret the information that might be
necessary or useful for evaluating organizational results”
was commonplace (Pfeffer 1981, p. 30). For example,
Abrahamson and Park (1994) found that corporations
avoid disclosing negative financial information unless they
are actively monitored by their boards and investors. This
research suggests that corporations strategically vary the
types and amount of information they publicly disclose
depending on how it reflects on them. Understanding such
processes of selective disclosure is particularly important
in today’s corporate environment. As Bromley and Powell
(2012, p. 483) conclude in their review of firms’ symbolic
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strategies, “[t]he pervasive spread of rationalizing trends
in society, such as the 0 0 0 increasing emphases on account-
ability and transparency, has [led to] growing pressure on
organizations to align their policies and practices, and to
conform to pressures in an expanding array of domains.”
Prior research suggests that firms’ social and environ-
mental performance are frequently the domain of symbolic
action. For instance, products alleged to cause breast
cancer have nonetheless been labeled with pink ribbons
to convey their manufacturers’ support for breast cancer
research (Breast Cancer Action 2011). Some companies
participating in the United Nations Global Compact have
been accused of “bluewashing” by affiliating with the
United Nations brand and the Compact’s lofty principles
to deflect attention from less savory management practices
(Williams 2004). Greenwashing, the focus of our study,
is portrayed as a common type of selective disclosure
whereby firms “mislead consumers about their [actual]
environmental performance” (Delmas and Burbano 2011,
p. 64) to create a false impression of transparency and
accountability. Our investigation seeks to identify orga-
nizational and institutional characteristics that predict
when corporate environmental disclosure indicates greater
accountability or greater symbolic action in the form of
greenwashing.
Organizational and Institutional Deterrents
of Selective Disclosure
To understand the organizational processes underlying
the extent to which corporate environmental information
disclosures constitute substantive or selective disclosures,
we hypothesize a set of factors that heighten companies’
exposure to scrutiny and global norms, both of which we
theorize will deter selective disclosure. Whereas prior
research has focused on how governmental attention may
reduce firms’ symbolic action (e.g., Short and Toffel
2010, Marquis and Qian 2014), less considered are the
effects of firms’ more general institutional environments—
including civil society—on the likelihood of organizational
symbolism.
Building on prior research on institutional and activist
pressure on organizations (King and Pearce 2010), our
theory and hypotheses identify two distinct mechanisms—
scrutiny and the diffusion of global norms—that limit
firms’ symbolic activity. Thus, our theoretical scope goes
beyond existing studies of the U.S. context (Kim and
Lyon 2011, 2015) and more accurately identifies how
types of institutional variation—political systems and
development stages of civil society—affect symbolic
processes. In our theory below, we argue that certain
organizational characteristics increase the likelihood that
an organization is exposed to these mechanisms. Prior
research suggests that more visible firms are subject
to more scrutiny, leading them to temper illegitimate
behaviors (Bansal and Roth 2000, King 2008). The pre-
sumed mechanism leading to this relationship is greater
perceived reputational risk. More visible firms receive
more attention from external stakeholders, which might
expose illegitimate behaviors that damage firms’ rep-
utations. This causes more visible firms to limit such
behavior.
We posit that environmentally damaging firms will be
less likely to engage in selective disclosure. Furthermore,
we theorize how the effects of this organizational charac-
teristic will vary depending on civil society processes in a
firm’s headquarters country that make it more likely that
such firms will experience scrutiny and be exposed to new
global norms, making environmental issues more salient
for corporate leaders. We focus on the countries of firms’
corporate headquarters because this is the institutional
environment of most senior manager decision makers,
board members, and shareholders who attend annual
meetings—and thus the institutional environment with the
most influence on corporate decisions (Guler et al. 2002).
Scrutiny and Selective Disclosure
Prior research provides conflicting theories and predictions
on whether firms with strong environmental performance
are less or more prone to selective disclosure than weak
performers. On the one hand, higher-performing firms
might be less prone to selective disclosure because they
have less to hide. Indeed, comprehensively disclosing
their environmental performance can legitimately convey
their superior environmental position to stakeholders.
Supporting this argument, the accounting literature sug-
gests that firms are motivated to voluntarily disclose only
information that bolsters their reputations (Dye 2001).
Pursuant to this theory, poorly performing firms would
engage in selective disclosure by disclosing only those
environmental indicators that enhanced their reputations
while cloaking the others.
On the other hand, the corporate environmental dis-
closure literature suggests that companies causing more
environmental damage are subjected to greater external
pressure and are more likely to comply with institutional
pressures to voluntarily disclose environmental informa-
tion (Short and Toffel 2008, Cho and Roberts 2010).
Several studies have shown that organizations’ greater
visibility leads them to comply with institutional demands
because they are likely to receive more attention—and
hence pressure—from a variety of external sources (Bansal
and Roth 2000, King 2008). Whereas organizational visi-
bility is frequently associated with firms’ size, reputation,
and public relations strategy (e.g., Bartley and Child
2014, King and McDonnell 2015), we argue that de facto
environmental damage is also a kind of visibility, exposing
organizations to attention from regulators and the public.
This is in effect a form of “issue visibility” that firms
acquire because of their proximity to a particular issue
(Jones and Keiser 1987, Neustadl 1990).
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For environmental issues in particular, poor perform-
ers have high salience because stakeholders can often
observe activities with environmental impact (Bansal and
Clelland 2004). For example, oil companies with weaker
environmental records attracted more media attention
when oil spills occurred, perhaps because their low per-
formance made them more visible and thus their negative
events more newsworthy (Luo et al. 2012). Environmen-
tal groups have relied on Toxic Release Inventory data
publicized by the EPA to generate reports of top polluters
specifically to invite public pressure (Wolf 1996). Such
scrutiny dissuades companies from selective disclosure
because getting caught at it can significantly damage their
reputations (Lyon and Maxwell 2011). Therefore, we
hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Companies causing more envi-
ronmental damage will exhibit less selective disclosure.
Given firms’ de facto environmental damage, the insti-
tutions in which firms are situated can also exert scrutiny
that deters selective disclosure. Institutions that mobilize
action and the ability of actors to speak up increase the
likelihood and expected costs of getting caught at selective
disclosure (e.g., Bagnoli and Watts 2014). In our context,
examples of such mobilization abound. For instance, when
countries and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
organize to pressure companies and governments to
address global environmental issues (for example, United
Nations conventions to prevent climate change), firms
likely perceive greater scrutiny regarding their environmen-
tal behavior—including their environmental disclosures.
Evidence suggests that instead of having a direct effect
on selective disclosure, increased scrutiny imposed by
activists moderates the effect of firms’ environmental
damage posited in H1 (Reid and Toffel 2009, Lyon and
Maxwell 2011).
Whereas prior approaches have mainly focused on
measuring social movement pressure as boycotts, protests,
and other activist actions targeting particular firms (e.g.,
King 2008), we hypothesize that particular country-level
institutional features will bolster a number of distinct
civil society pressure on firms to refrain from selective
disclosure and disclose more representative environmental
information. Furthermore, prior research on activists and
greenwashing has typically been conducted only in the
U.S. context, where the robustness of civil society is
taken for granted (Kim and Lyon 2011, 2015). The key
features we examine include the presence of activists and
the legal protections afforded to civil and political actions
in a global context across not just democratic but also
autocratic polities. In this way, we provide a more refined
and accurate conceptualization of how these factors may
affect symbolic processes. We expect that each of these
institutional features will accentuate the tendency for
more visible firms—in our context, those causing more
environmental damage—to avoid selective disclosure.
Civil Society’s Ability to Mobilize. Significant research
has shown that social activists’ influence on corporate
behavior relies ultimately on collective action, citizen
pressure, and sometimes consumer boycotts (King and
Pearce 2010). Evidence indicates that companies’ strate-
gies and management practices are influenced by a wide
array of collective action by activists (Eesley and Lenox
2006, King 2008, Lenox and Eesley 2009, Reid and
Toffel 2009). For instance, several major global apparel
makers, seeking to avoid a sweatshop stigma that activists
threatened to impose, adopted voluntary codes of conduct
and internal compliance-monitoring programs (Locke
2013). And in our context, it has been shown that activism
focused on companies’ environmental issues improves
their environmental performance (e.g., Delmas and Toffel
2008, Chatterji and Toffel 2010) and may even dissuade
companies from participating in voluntary environmental
programs that activists might view negatively (Kim and
Lyon 2011).
Activists are more likely to influence company behavior
when they attract media attention to their cause because
media coverage intensifies societal attention (King 2008).
This often leads activists to consider potential media
coverage when they select which companies to target for
scrutiny, which, in turn, often leads them to select the
most visible companies as well as those struggling with
the issues the activists are concerned about (Rehbein et al.
2004). This would lead environmental activists to target
for scrutiny those companies causing more environmental
damage. Institutional settings possessing strong civil
society defenders of particular norms pose a threat to
firms whose behaviors already stretch the boundaries of
legitimacy.
Crucial to civil society’s potential to influence com-
pany behavior is the ability to organize “collective
vehicles 0 0 0 through which people mobilize and engage in
collective action” (McAdam et al. 1996, p. 3). For many
movements, the local presence of NGOs has been shown
to be a key organizational mechanism of citizenry mobi-
lization and activism (Sine and Lee 2009), magnifying
individual voices to intensify pressure on companies. In
our context, this suggests that institutional settings with
strong environmental activist pressures, such as those with
many environmental NGOs, compound the risk of scrutiny
for companies causing more environmental damage. This
makes such companies even more likely to avoid selective
disclosure regarding their environmental performance.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Companies causing more envi-
ronmental damage will exhibit particularly low levels of
selective disclosure when headquartered in countries with
more environmental NGOs.
Civil Society’s Ability to Speak Up. We propose that
strong civil liberties and political rights are critical com-
ponents that enable civil society scrutiny to deter environ-
mentally damaging companies from selective disclosure.
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Actors seeking to enforce global norms of accountability
and environmental transparency rely on the ability to
speak up to pressure companies to conform. Most prior
studies have examined the effects of speech on action
in settings where there are strong institutions protecting
those seeking to engage in collective action and where
the ability to speak up is taken for granted (King and
Pearce 2010). Strong civil liberties and political rights
secure the ability of civil society actors to criticize cor-
porate behavior, to take social action, and to lobby for
political support when companies violate global norms.
This ability is far less secure in regimes that do not
afford these rights. Discussing “civic environmentalism,”
Steinberg (2002, p. 26) argued that the “challenges of
sustained collective action are compounded when 0 0 0 the
expression of dissenting views [is] considered a threat by
state authorities.”
The more environmental damage a firm causes, the
more salient that damage is likely to be to civil society
actors (as discussed in the argument for H2). In settings
where greater civil liberties and political rights make it
easier to scrutinize corporate behavior and speak up about
it, corporate leaders of more environmentally damaging
firms will be especially concerned that selective disclosure
would be exposed by the local press or civil society
actors (Campbell 2005, King 2008). Thus, we propose
that firms causing more environmental damage will be
particularly concerned about scrutiny and so especially
unlikely to engage in selective disclosure when headquar-
tered in countries that provide greater civil liberties and
political rights.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Companies causing more envi-
ronmental damage will exhibit particularly low levels of
selective disclosure when headquartered in countries with
strong civil liberties and political rights.
Information Diffusion and Normative Expectations
Regarding Selective Disclosure
As the networks linking countries, organizations, and
individuals expand and intensify, the global norms of infor-
mation disclosure and transparency have become more
widely disseminated (Aguilera and Jackson 2010). We
examine two processes by which the effect a firm’s envi-
ronmental damage has on its use of selective disclosure
can be accentuated by the diffusion of global norms.
First, firms headquartered in places where civil society
is more exposed to global norms face growing pressures
to avoid contradicting these global norms. Whereas the
previously hypothesized activism mechanism relies on
coercion through the threat of NGO and political activism,
an information diffusion mechanism relies on firms adapt-
ing to global norms as they become more aware of them.
Second, companies learn about global trends, such as
environmental disclosure, not only by being in institu-
tional contexts well connected to global society, but also
through direct exposure to foreign financial governance
rules and to foreign investors.
Civil Society’s Exposure to Global Norms. A popu-
lation’s exposure to new ideas and norms from other
countries is a complex process that can result from inter-
national trade, employment of foreigners, interactions
with foreign embassies and consulates, telephone and
Internet information flows, and international tourism.
Such information diffusion mechanisms are important
to understand because the globalization of societies is
“mediated through a variety of flows including people,
information and ideas, capital and goods” (Dreher 2006,
p. 1092). Such exposure brings about a “norm cascade,”
found in many contexts, whereby a norm diffuses across
international borders, becomes taken for granted, and
influences the activities of individuals and organizations
around the world (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). Research
has also shown that the diffusion of global norms is partic-
ularly likely among a country’s elite, including corporate
executives, because they are more likely to be part of
global networks (Reimann 2001). When a country’s civil
society is more exposed to global norms, such as the
increasing expectations of corporate accountability and
corporate environmental transparency, these issues will
become more salient to that country’s corporate leaders.
Access to global information trends affects a soci-
ety’s normative expectations of firms (Guler et al. 2002).
We argue that such information will be particularly influ-
ential for companies causing more environmental damage.
Managers of particularly visible firms are thought to view
themselves as being especially vulnerable to future cri-
tique (Bartley and Child 2011). Because environmentally
damaging firms are especially attuned to the reputational
risks of their operations (as discussed in the argument
for H1), we expect them to perceive even greater reputa-
tional risk when they are exposed to global environmental
norms. Therefore, they will be even more likely than the
average firm to temper their selective disclosure.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Companies causing more envi-
ronmental damage will exhibit particularly low levels of
selective disclosure when headquartered in countries that
are more connected to global society.
Corporate Internationalization. Another key process
that affects a company’s recognition of global norms such
as environmental disclosure is the extent to which its
business operations are directly connected to the global
society. A key way companies connect to the global
society is to list or cross-list their shares on foreign
stock exchanges. This tends to expose them to report-
ing requirements—regarding governance and financial
matters—that are more stringent than those in their home
countries (Davis and Marquis 2005). Foreign listings typi-
cally require companies to be more transparent about their
accounting policies, board and management structure, and
ownership structure (Khanna et al. 2004). These height-
ened transparency standards, which are audited and legally
enforced, require companies to more comprehensively
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report and accurately convey their financial indicators.
Not only do such companies have fewer opportunities for
selective disclosure in corporate financial reporting, but
they also gain exposure to norms and practices valuing
more comprehensive transparency.
In line with a growing literature in finance and interna-
tional business (Karolyi 2006), we posit that there will be
a spillover effect whereby the company learns that more
stringent standards and scrutiny exist and recognizes that
it may face them in the future. Davis and Marquis (2005),
for instance, showed how such global exposure increased
the likelihood that international firms adhered to U.S.
practices of voluntarily disclosing certain governance
information. Similarly, after cross-listing in the United
States, firms from 40 countries were more likely to follow
the U.S. practice of voluntarily disclosing management
earnings forecasts (Shi et al. 2012). Other studies in this
line of research have shown that Anglo-American CEO
compensation practices spread to Scandinavian firms after
they listed on Anglo-American exchanges (Oxelheim and
Randoy 2005).
We argue that through this spillover process, many
managers of foreign-listed corporations will come to inter-
nalize norms and practices of transparency as a legitimate
and appropriate behavior expected of companies, making
it less likely for them to engage in selective disclosure.
Because firms causing more environmental damage are
particularly attuned to regulatory signals and societal
normative expectations as argued previously, the internal-
ization of norms of transparency will be accentuated once
they are exposed to the foreign capital market.
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Environmentally damaging com-
panies listed on foreign stock exchanges will exhibit less
selective disclosure.
Data and Measures
Sample
To test our hypotheses, we gathered data on the companies
listed on the following major stock indices during 2004–
2007: ASX 200, Dow Jones STOXX Europe 600, FTSE
All Share, MSCI Asia ex Japan, MSCI World, Nikkei 225,
Russell 1000, and S&P 500. This sampling frame was
determined by the coverage at that time of Trucost Plc.,
an organization established in 2000 to develop a more
sophisticated approach to calculating the environmental
impacts of company operations, supply chains, and invest-
ment portfolios.1 To construct our measures of selective
disclosure and environmental damage, as described below,
we purchased from Trucost a panel of 15,108 firm-year
observations from 4,787 firms over this four-year period;
the panel is unbalanced because of annual changes in
index membership and slight changes in the size of some
indices.2 To construct our estimation sample, we dropped
a total of 37 firms (71 firm-year observations) for three
reasons: 3 firms (8 firm-year observations) were missing
an industry classification, 15 firms (18 observations) were
headquartered in countries from which we had fewer than
5 firm-year observations, and 19 firms (45 observations)
were from 4 countries in which none of the firms in our
panel had disclosures.3 This resulted in an estimation
sample of 15,037 observations from 4,750 companies
headquartered in 45 countries: 3,227 observations in 2004,
3,832 in 2005, 4,104 in 2006, and 3,874 in 2007. The
distributions of industries and headquarters countries for
the companies in our sample are reported in Tables A1
and A2 in Online Appendix A (available as supplemental
material at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2015.1039).4
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable, selective disclosure magnitude,
represents the extent to which companies risk creating a
misleading impression of transparency and accountability
by disclosing relatively benign environmental metrics
rather than those more representative of their overall
environmental harm. This is a form of greenwashing
because it involves a company conveying accurate but
selective environmental information that creates a mislead-
ing impression of its overall environmental performance
(Delmas and Burbano 2011, Kim and Lyon 2011, Lyon
and Maxwell 2011, Bowen 2014). Selective disclosure
magnitude is calculated as the difference between two
ratios that Trucost developed to assess companies’ envi-
ronmental transparency; that is, absolute disclosure ratio
minus weighted disclosure ratio.5 This measure is aligned
with Lyon and Maxwell (2011, p. 5), given their conclu-
sion that “greenwash can be characterized as the selective
disclosure of positive information about a company’s
environmental or social performance, while withholding
negative information on these dimensions.” Selective
disclosure magnitude seeks to measure the extent to which
symbolic transparency (measured by absolute disclosure
ratio) exceeds substantive transparency (measured by
weighted disclosure ratio). Online Appendix B describes
the construction of selective disclosure magnitude in more
detail; further information about Trucost’s methodology is
available from Trucost Plc. (2008).6
Briefly, the absolute disclosure ratio is the proportion
of relevant environmental indicators for which a company
publicly discloses quantitative worldwide figures. The
denominator of this ratio is the number of environmental
indicators relevant to a particular company based on
the industries in which it operates. Trucost identifies
this relevant set for each company based on data from
pollution release and transfer registries, economic input-
output models, and company reports.7 The numerator is
the number of these indicators that the company publicly
discloses in, for example, its annual reports, regulatory
filings, and corporate website. The weighted disclosure
ratio takes this concept a step further by incorporating
the extent of environmental impact associated with each
Do
wn
loa
de
d f
rom
 in
for
ms
.or
g b
y [
13
2.2
36
.27
.11
1] 
on
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
16
, a
t 0
3:0
3 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Marquis, Toffel, and Zhou: Scrutiny, Norms, and Selective Disclosure
Organization Science 27(2), pp. 483–504, © 2016 INFORMS 489
environmental indicator.8 In short, the absolute disclosure
ratio reflects how many of the relevant environmental
indicators the company disclosed—regardless of their
relative importance—and the weighted disclosure ratio
shows how much of the most important information was
disclosed.
When a company’s absolute disclosure ratio exceeds its
weighted disclosure ratio, selective disclosure magnitude
is positive, which indicates that the company disclosed its
less harmful indicators.9 Selective disclosure magnitude
approaches its maximum value of 1 when a company
discloses many of its less harmful indicators but few if
any of its more harmful indicators. Such a company could
easily create the impression of transparency while in
fact hiding quite a lot. In contrast, a company disclosing
just the few indicators that matter most in terms of
its environmental harm will have a selective disclosure
magnitude tending toward the minimum value of É1.10
Independent Variables
To measure a firm’s environmental damage, we use Tru-
cost’s estimate of environmental impact, which is based
on the following process described in Thomas et al.
(2007) and Trucost Plc. (2008). First, Trucost allocates a
company’s annual revenues to a subset of a standardized
set of 464 industries (typically one to a few dozen of
these industries for each company), based on data from
the FactSet Fundamentals database, corporate annual
reports, corporate regulatory filings, and feedback from
the company. Second, Trucost’s model estimates the com-
pany’s total annual tonnage of pollution emissions released
(to air, land, and water) and resources consumed (such as
metals, water, oil, natural gas, and mined materials), based
on the company’s revenues from each industry. These
calculations are based on environmental factors derived
from several pollution release and transfer registries
(national databases with inventories of natural resources
and pollutants associated with many establishments in
various industries) and economic input–output models
(which model trade between suppliers and buyers). Third,
these physical quantities are multiplied by their respective
environmental damage cost factors, which are drawn
from academic research on the pricing of environmental
externalities and refer to costs “borne by society through
the degradation of the environment but which [are] not
borne by the firm that uses the resource or emits the
pollutant” (Trucost Plc. 2008, p. 4).11 The total represents
the cost of the environmental damage created by each
company in a particular year in millions of U.S. dollars.
For our variable, environmental damage, we log Trucost’s
environmental damage cost to accommodate its skewed
distribution.
We measured three aspects of the civil society insti-
tutions of each company’s headquarters country.12 We
measure the density of environmental NGOs in each
company’s headquarters country as the number of envi-
ronmental NGOs per million population (Esty et al. 2005).
Specifically, we divide the number of International Union
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) member organizations
operating in each company’s headquarters country in
2003, the year before our sample period, by that country’s
population in 2004 (measured in millions). IUCN is
an international environmental organization with more
than 1,000 member organizations, including the most
significant international environmental NGOs, such as
Conservation International, the National Geographic Soci-
ety, and the Sierra Club. The presence of such NGOs has
frequently been used in the organizational and sociology
literatures to proxy local social movement processes
(e.g., Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004, Sine and Lee 2009).
We measure a country’s civil liberties and political
rights based on data from annual Freedom in the World
reports,13 which assess civil liberties (such as freedom of
expression and assembly) and political rights (such as
free elections).14 We used the annual national averages of
political rights and civil liberties scores—an approach
used by others (e.g., Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004, Vaaler
2008, Longhofer and Schofer 2010)—and reverse-coded
the results so that higher values reflect more civil liberties
and political rights.15
Based on a general logic of diffusion (e.g., Rogers
1995), we measure the extent to which a country is
exposed to global norms using a globalization index called
the “KOF Index of Globalization.” Developed by Dreher
and colleagues (Dreher 2006, Dreher et al. 2008)16 and
used by many scholars of globalization (e.g., Fischer
2008), this index is calculated annually for 208 countries
and incorporates a country’s social, economic, and political
integration with other countries (Keohane and Nye 2000).
A country’s social integration—the flow of international
information and norms—is reflected in the KOF index by
measures of personal contacts (such as telephone traffic,
international tourism, and the proportion of population that
are foreigners), information flows (such as the prevalence
of Internet access), and cultural proximity (the exchange
of ideas abroad, such as the import and export of books
as a percent of GDP). Economic integration is measured
by trade flow indicators (such as the value of international
trade and foreign direct investment, each normalized as
percentages of the country’s gross domestic product) and
trade restrictions (such as import barriers and tariffs).
Political integration is represented by measures such as
the number of foreign embassies in the country and the
number of UN peace missions in which the country has
participated.
Using stock exchange listings data from Datastream,
we created a dichotomous variable listed on a foreign
stock exchange, coded 1 for companies that listed their
stock on an exchange outside their headquarters country
in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
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Control Variables
Because establishing or maintaining a company’s reputa-
tion affects patterns of communication about its social
responsibility (McDonnell and King 2013), we controlled
for whether a company had a high reputation in a given
year based on whether the corporation or any of its
subsidiaries were included that year in any of the Rep-
utation Institute’s 116 high-reputation lists, which are
compiled primarily by Fortune, Hewitt, Interbrand, and the
Reputation Institute.17 High reputation is a dichotomous
variable coded 1 for corporations listed on any of these
lists in a given year and 0 otherwise. We control for
an organization’s size using the log of annual sales, an
approach used in many studies of corporate environmental
and social disclosure (e.g., Cho and Patten 2007, Reid and
Toffel 2009). We obtained annual corporate-wide sales
data reported in millions of U.S. dollars from Compustat
and used log values in our models to accommodate the
skewed distribution of sales. Because firms more reliant
on domestic versus foreign sales might be exposed to or
vulnerable to different institutional pressures, we con-
trolled for percentage of sales to foreign countries—that
is, nonheadquarters countries—using annual data from
Worldscope.
Because prior studies have argued and shown that
an organization’s financial performance influences its
environmental disclosure (Barth et al. 1997, Neu et al.
1998), we control for an organization’s financial per-
formance using its annual return on assets, calculated
as net income divided by starting-year assets, both of
which we obtained from Compustat. To avoid the undue
influence of a few outliers, we winsorized this ratio
by recoding values below the 0.1 percentile and values
above the 99.9 percentile to those values, respectively.
We control for firms’ annual capital intensity—calculated
as the ratio of net property, plant, and equipment to total
assets, both obtained from Worldscope—because capital
intensity can affect environmental damage and the likeli-
hood of selective disclosure. Capital intensity can also
capture important intra-industry variation. We control for
a company’s annual corporate-wide employment because
employees are a powerful group of stakeholders in many
societies (Barnett 2007) and large employers may hold
disproportionate political power in a country. Because
average company employment differs substantially across
countries, our measure of employment is standardized by
country. We obtain employment data from Worldscope.
Because research has revealed very different levels of
environmental and social disclosure in different industries
(Cho and Patten 2007, Reid and Toffel 2009), we create
industry dummies to denote each company’s primary
two-digit SIC code based on Compustat data.
Because prior research has shown that a country’s
adoption of environmental practices is influenced by
its commitment to engage in global environmental gov-
ernance (Frank et al. 2000), we control for intergov-
ernmental environmental organizations, the number of
memberships each country held in 100 major environ-
mental intergovernmental organizations. We obtained
these data from the 2001 Environmental Sustainability
Index, which standardized these values to a mean of 0
and a standard deviation of 1 based on the raw values
from 122 countries.18 We control for the potential for
media attention, which has been shown to be an important
mechanism of institutional compliance (King 2008), by
using the World Press Freedom Index that is produced
annually by Reporters Without Borders (Faccio 2006). We
multiplied these annual country-level values by É1 so that
higher values of press freedom reflect greater freedom.19
To control for general levels of transparency in a society,
we measured each country’s corruption level each year
based on Transparency International’s annual Corruption
Perceptions Index, which measures the “overall extent
of corruption (frequency and/or size of bribes) in the
public and political sectors” based on data from several
institutions including the Asian Development Bank and
the World Economic Forum.20 We reverse-coded the
Corruption Perceptions Index values so that increasing
values reflect greater corruption.
Because a country’s economic development can affect
the diffusion rate of organizational practices (Guler et al.
2002) and can affect environmental practices more gen-
erally (Inglehart 1990), we control for each country’s
per capita gross domestic product in a given year. We
obtained country-level data on annual gross domestic
product, reported in 2005 U.S. dollars, from the World
Bank and annual population data from the U.S. Census
Bureau, compiled by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Economic Research Service.21 To reduce skew, we use
logged ratios in our models. Because stringent account-
ing standards might decrease the likelihood of selective
disclosure, we obtained data on a country’s accounting
standards stringency from La Porta et al. (1998), which
was based on the comprehensiveness of financial state-
ments from a sample of corporate annual reports. Higher
index values indicate more stringent accounting standards.
We rescaled the raw index values to range from 0 to 1.
Many companies were headquartered in countries
engaged in the Kyoto Protocol and thus were (or might in
the future be) required to calculate and disclose greenhouse
gas emissions, which might influence their disclosure
practices. We control for this actual or potential regulatory
pressure by creating an annual country-level dichotomous
variable, Kyoto Protocol ratified, coded 1 starting the year
when the protocol was ratified (or accepted or accessed)
and entered into force in that country and 0 in the pre-
ceding years. We coded this variable 0 for all years for
countries, such as the United States, in which the protocol
had not entered into force during our sample period. We
distinguished ratifying countries that were required to
reduce emissions as part of their Kyoto obligations—all
those listed in “Annex 1,” such as the United Kingdom—
by creating a dichotomous variable Kyoto Protocol bound,
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coded 1 for such countries in the years since the protocol
entered into force. We coded this variable 0 for all other
countries, including those that ratified the protocol but
which lacked such obligations (such as Thailand) and
those that did not ratify the protocol.22 We obtained these
data from the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change website.23
Companies headquartered in countries with poor envi-
ronmental quality (that is, environmental stress) might
face particularly high demands for environmental dis-
closure, which may lead to disproportionate pressure
for selective disclosure. To measure the extent to which
pollution and resource consumption are stressing a coun-
try’s environmental systems, we obtained environmental
stress values for each country using a composite indicator
from the 2002 Environmental Sustainability Index.24 This
measure incorporates emissions and the use of fertilizers
and pesticides (all normalized by land area), change in
forest cover, per capita natural resource consumption, and
projected population growth rates.
Table 1 reports summary statistics.25 All of our vari-
ables are measured annually except three country-level
variables for which we could not obtain annual data
corresponding to our sample period (environmental NGOs
per million population, intergovernmental environmental
organizations, and accounting standards stringency). For
Table 1 Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Selective disclosure magnitude É0010 0.23 É0094 0063
Absolute disclosure ratio 0005 0.13 0000 1000
Weighted disclosure ratio 0015 0.31 0000 1000
Environmental damage§ 2009 1.98 0000 6049
Environmental NGOs per million population§ 0053 0.48 0 1063
Civil liberties and political rights§ 5033 1.60 0 6
Globalization index§ 0073 0.20 0 0090
Listed on a foreign stock exchange 0072 0.45 0 1
Percentage of sales to foreign countries§ 0012 0.24 0 0078
Sales§ 7034 1.98 0 10025
High reputation 0013 0.34 0 1
Return on assets 0007 0.15 É2071 1036
Capital intensity 0030 0.26 0 1
Employment† 0005 1.02 É1043 29048
Intergovernmental environmental organizations 1042 0.77 É0088 2054
Press freedom 0087 0.16 0 1
Corruption 2061 1.54 0 8
Per capita gross domestic product 10022 1.09 0 11031
Accounting standards stringency 0067 0.16 0 0083
Kyoto Protocol ratified 0047 0.50 0 1
Kyoto Protocol bound 0026 0.44 0 1
Environmental stress 0030 0.15 0 0065
Kyoto progress 1046 5.94 É25080 32050
Ahead of Kyoto 0020 0.40 0 1
Notes. N = 15,037 firm-year observations pertaining to 4,750 firms headquartered in 45 countries. §Denotes winsorized
(top-coded) at the 95th percentile. †Denotes standardized by country. The following variables were standardized for use
in the regression model (such that mean= 0 and SD= 1), which resulted in the following minimum and maximum values:
environmental damage 4É1005120235, environmental NGOs per million population 4É1011120325, civil liberties and political
rights 4É3033100425, and globalization index 4É3069100875.
those three variables, we used the most recent values
available before our sample period.
Empirical Analysis
Our models predict selective disclosure magnitude based
on all of the independent variables and control vari-
ables described above. We also include a full set of
year dummies to control for overall temporal trends. To
facilitate interpretation, we standardize the four variables
included in interaction terms: environmental damage,
environmental NGOs per million population, civil liberties
and political rights, and globalization index. To address
concerns associated with multicollinearity, we test each
moderated relationship by including each interaction term
in a distinct model.
For each of the variables for which we recoded missing
values to 0, we included a corresponding dichotomous
variable coded 1 to denote observations which had been
recoded and 0 otherwise (Maddala 1977, p. 202; Greene
2007, p. 62). This approach, common in econometric
analysis, is algebraically equivalent to recoding missing
values with the variable’s mean (Greene 2007, p. 62).26
Nearly identical coefficient magnitudes and standard
errors resulted from two alternative approaches to accom-
modate missing values: (1) using multiple imputation
with our primary hierarchical linear model estimation
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approach and (2) using structural equation modeling
with full information maximum likelihood (Enders and
Bandalos 2001).
Regression Results
We estimate our models using multilevel mixed-effects
linear regression (a flexible form of a hierarchical linear
model or HLM) that accounts for the multilevel structure
of our panel data—which nests firms’ multiple observa-
tions over time within their headquarter country—and
allows for both fixed and random effects. We report
standard errors clustered by country.27 Table 3 presents
our results.
Model 1 includes only direct effects. A likelihood
ratio test comparing the fitted mixed model to standard
regression with no group-level random effects rejects
the null that all random-effects parameters of the mixed
model are simultaneously zero 4ï2 = 4756011p < 00015.
The statistically significant negative coefficient on envi-
ronmental damage in Model 1 indicates that organizations
causing more environmental damage exhibit less selec-
tive disclosure, which supports H1.28 The coefficient on
this standardized variable indicates that a one-standard-
deviation increase in environmental damage is associated
with a 0.10 decline in selective disclosure magnitude, the
equivalent of nearly one-half a standard deviation (cal-
culated as Çenvironmental damage÷ SDselective disclosure magnitude =É00093÷ 0023=É0040).
The significant negative coefficient on the interaction
term between environmental NGOs per million population
and environmental damage in Model 2 indicates that firms
causing more environmental damage are especially less
prone to selective disclosure when there is a greater NGO
presence in their countries, a result that supports H2. Fig-
ure 1 graphically illustrates this effect. Average predicted
values indicate that firms causing more environmental
damage engage in less selective disclosure and that this
relationship is especially pronounced in countries with
more environmental NGOs per capita.29
The statistically significant negative coefficient on the
interaction term in Model 3 indicates that companies caus-
ing more environmental damage are especially disinclined
to selective disclosure in countries featuring more civil
liberties and political rights. This finding supports H3,
and this relationship is depicted in Figure 2. Average pre-
dicted values indicate that selective disclosure magnitude
declines as environmental damage increases and show
that a higher level of civil liberties and political rights
significantly exacerbate the decline.30 This relationship
supports our theory that firms causing more environmental
damage are especially likely to avoid selective disclosure
when they operate in environments with greater scrutiny.
The significant negative coefficient on the interaction
term between environmental damage and globalization
index in Model 4 indicates that greater environmental
damage is associated with less selective disclosure in
more highly globalized countries, lending support to H4
(and see also Figure 3). Average predicted values of
selective disclosure magnitude decline as environmental
damage increases, and the decline is significantly more
rapid among companies headquartered in highly glob-
alized countries.31 The statistically significant negative
coefficient on the interaction term in Model 5 indicates
that greater environmental damage is associated with
a more pronounced decline in selective disclosure for
companies listed on foreign exchanges than for those
not listed on foreign exchanges, lending support to H5.32
Figure 4 graphically displays this relationship.
This set of findings supports our theory of how exposure
to global norms of information transparency through
both home country characteristics and firm attributes
influences firms’ selective disclosure. We discuss the
broader theoretical implications of our findings below.
Extension: The Impact of Visibility and
Scrutiny on Firms’ Disclosure Levels
Whereas the results above confirm that many of our
hypothesized constructs influence selective disclosure
magnitude, we conducted additional analyses to better
understand the mechanisms underlying these relationships.
Recall that selective disclosure magnitude is calculated as
the difference between two ratios to measure the extent to
which companies disclose relatively benign environmental
metrics rather than those more representative of their
overall environmental harm. The predicted declines in
selective disclosure that we hypothesize might be driven
by (a) weighted disclosure increasing more than absolute
disclosure or by (b) weighted disclosure declining less than
absolute disclosure. To determine which of these scenarios
was driving our results, we estimated separate HLM
regressions predicting the absolute disclosure ratio and the
weighted disclosure ratio—the components of selective
disclosure magnitude—based on all the independent and
control variables from our primary models.
Columns 1a and 1b in Table 4 report results of the
models that decompose the effects of Model 1 reported
in Table 3. The positive coefficient on environmental
damage is of greater magnitude in Model 1b than in
Model 1a, which indicates that more environmental
damage is associated with a greater increase in substantive
disclosure (weighted disclosure ratio) than in symbolic
disclosure (absolute disclosure ratio). This supports our
intuition that more environmentally damaging firms really
do exhibit more substantive disclosure.33 The coefficients
on the interaction terms are near zero and nonsignificant in
Models 2a, 3a, and 4a, which predict absolute disclosure
ratio, but they are consistently significant and positive in
Models 2b, 3b, and 4b, which predict weighted disclosure
ratio. This indicates that the institutions that seem to deter
more environmentally damaging firms from selectively
disclosing appear to have this effect by encouraging such
firms to report more relevant environmental indicators.
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Table 3 Regression Results of Primary Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Selective disclosure magnitude Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
H1 Environmental damage§¤ É00093⇤⇤ É00095⇤⇤ É00095⇤⇤ É00094⇤⇤ É00072⇤⇤
6000097 6000097 6000087 6000087 6000107
H2 Environmental NGOs per million population§¤ É00022⇤⇤
⇥Environmental damage§¤ 6000047
Environmental NGOs per million population§¤ 00005 00002 00004 00004 00005
6000167 6000167 6000157 6000157 6000157
H3 Civil liberties and political rights§¤ É00013⇤⇤
⇥Environmental damage§¤ 6000047
Civil liberties and political rights§¤ 00002 00003 00004 00003 00002
6000147 6000137 6000147 6000137 6000147
H4 Globalization index§¤ É00018⇤⇤
⇥Environmental damage§¤ 6000067
Globalization index§¤ É00108⇤⇤ É00106⇤⇤ É00106⇤⇤ É00104⇤⇤ É00103⇤⇤
6000137 6000147 6000137 6000137 6000137
H5 Listed on a foreign stock exchange É00027⇤⇤
Environmental damage§¤ 6000097
Listed on a foreign stock exchange É00029⇤⇤ É00028⇤⇤ É00028⇤⇤ É00028⇤⇤ É00034⇤⇤
6000057 6000057 6000057 6000047 6000067
Firm-level Percentage of sales to foreign countries§¤ É00005⇤ É00004+ É00005⇤ É00004+ É00005⇤
controls 6000027 6000027 6000037 6000027 6000027
Sales§¤ É00011 É00009 É00010 É00010 É00012
6000107 6000107 6000107 6000107 6000107
High reputation É00016+ É00018⇤ É00015+ É00015+ É00015+
6000087 6000087 6000097 6000087 6000087
Return on assets É00002 É00000 É00001 É00001 É00002
6000057 6000057 6000057 6000057 6000057
Capital intensity É00054⇤⇤ É00054⇤⇤ É00054⇤⇤ É00053⇤⇤ É00052⇤⇤
6000117 6000127 6000117 6000127 6000117
Employment† É00004 É00004 É00004 É00004 É00004
6000037 6000037 6000037 6000037 6000037
Country-level Intergovernmental environmental É00032⇤⇤ É00032⇤⇤ É00033⇤⇤ É00033⇤⇤ É00031⇤⇤
controls organizations 6000107 6000107 6000107 6000107 6000107
Press freedom É00064 É00057 É00056 É00068 É00069
6000527 6000497 6000527 6000477 6000517
Corruption 00012 00012 00012 00012 00012
6000097 6000097 6000097 6000097 6000097
Per capita gross domestic product 00068⇤⇤ 00066⇤⇤ 00065⇤⇤ 00066⇤⇤ 00067⇤⇤
6000117 6000117 6000117 6000117 6000117
Accounting standards stringency 00050 00061 00056 00053 00059
6001187 6001177 6001207 6001187 6001177
Kyoto Protocol ratified 00001 00001 00000 00003 00001
6000097 6000097 6000097 6000097 6000097
Kyoto Protocol bound É00006 É00006 É00005 É00006 É00006
6000077 6000077 6000077 6000077 6000077
Environmental stress 00019 00018 00019 00015 00018
6000637 6000667 6000637 6000637 6000627
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Notes. Regression coefficients of a hierarchical linear model with firms nested within headquarters countries. Brackets contain standard
errors clustered by country; ⇤⇤p < 0001; ⇤p < 0005; +p < 0010. For all models, N = 15,037 firm-year observations pertaining to 4,750 firms
headquartered in 45 countries. §Denotes winsorized (top-coded) at the 95th percentile. ¤Denotes standardized variables. †Denotes
standardized by country. All models also include dummy variables denoting instances where missing values of the following variables were
recoded to 0: the country’s globalization index, civil liberties and political rights, environmental NGOs per million population, intergovernmental
environmental organizations, accounting standards stringency, and environmental stress and the organization’s percentage of sales to foreign
countries and employment.
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Figure 1 Graphing H2 Results
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Notes. Selective disclosure is less prevalent among firms caus-
ing greater environmental damage. This relationship is especially
pronounced among companies headquartered in countries with
higher scrutiny, as indicated by more environmental NGOs. This
figure depicts average predicted values generated from Model 2 of
Table 3. The lines represent the average predicted values generated
by each observation’s actual values, except environmental damage
is estimated at each labeled value and environmental NGOs per
million population is estimated at the following fixed points. The solid
line depicts estimates made at the 5th percentile of environmental
NGOs per million population, which reflects institutional environments
with a low density of environmental activists. The dashed line depicts
estimates at the 95th percentile of environmental NGOs per million
population, which reflects institutional environments with a high
density of environmental activists.
Figure 3 Graphing H4 Results
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Notes. Selective disclosure is less prevalent among firms causing
greater environmental damage. This relationship is especially pro-
nounced among companies headquartered in countries with higher
normative expectations regarding selective disclosure via a high level
of connection to global society. This figure depicts average predicted
values generated from Model 4 of Table 3. The lines represent
the average predicted values generated by each observation’s
actual values, except environmental damage is estimated at each
labeled value and the following fixed points. The solid line depicts
estimates made at the 5th percentile of globalization index, which
reflects institutional environments with a low level of globalization. The
dashed line depicts estimates at the 95th percentile of globalization
index, which reflects institutional environments with a high level of
globalization.
Figure 2 Graphing H3 Results
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Notes. Selective disclosure is less prevalent among firms caus-
ing greater environmental damage. This relationship is especially
pronounced among companies headquartered in countries with
higher potential for scrutiny, as indicated by high levels of civil
liberties and political rights. This figure depicts average predicted
values generated from Model 3 of Table 3. The lines represent the
average predicted values generated by each observation’s actual
values, except environmental damage is estimated at each labeled
value and the following fixed points. The solid line depicts estimates
made at the 5th percentile of civil liberties and political rights, which
reflects institutional environments with few such liberties and rights.
The dashed line depicts estimates at the 95th percentile of civil
liberties and political rights, which reflects institutional environments
with a high level of such liberties and rights.
Figure 4 Graphing H5 Results
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Notes. Selective disclosure is less prevalent among firms with
causing environmental damage. This relationship is especially
pronounced among companies facing more governance rules, as
indicated by being listed on a foreign stock exchange. This figure
depicts average predicted values generated from Model 5 of Table 3.
The lines represent the average predicted values generated by
each observation’s actual values, except environmental damage is
estimated at each labeled value. The dashed line depicts averages
of these predicted values for the subsample of observations in
which firms were listed on a foreign exchange. The solid line depicts
estimates for the opposite subsample of observations in which firms
were not listed on a foreign exchange.
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Similarly, whereas both Models 5a and 5b yield statisti-
cally significant positive coefficients on the interaction
of environmental damage and listed on a foreign stock
exchange, comparing the coefficient sizes indicates that
the incremental effect of environmental damage on foreign-
listed firms’ weighted disclosure is nearly four times the
magnitude on absolute disclosure. In other words, insti-
tutional scrutiny and information diffusion mechanisms
appear to lead more environmentally damaging firms to
report more of what matters most: those environmental
indicators that more comprehensively communicate the
environmental harm their operations impose.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our study examined a set of organizational and institu-
tional factors that affect both scrutiny of and normative
pressures on firms and thus the extent to which they
engage in the symbolic strategy of selective disclosure.
Despite prior research that suggests the opposite may be
true, our analysis of the symbolic environmental trans-
parency practices of thousands of public firms headquar-
tered across 45 countries revealed that those posing more
environmental damage were particularly likely to eschew
selective disclosure. Building on prior research indicating
that poor environmental performance makes firms more
visible to stakeholders with environmental concerns, our
theory focuses on how this characteristic exposes firms
to greater scrutiny, which leads them to engage less
in selective disclosure. Our interaction results further
support our proposition that scrutiny and norms drive
this relationship. Specifically, we hypothesized and found
that civil society’s activism and information access had
especially pronounced inhibiting effects on the selective
disclosure exhibited by more environmentally damaging
firms. We also hypothesized and found less selective dis-
closure by firms subjected to information disclosure norms
through their greater exposure to foreign investors. Our
empirical extension, which examined the two components
of our selective disclosure measure—absolute disclosure
level and weighted disclosure level—provides further
evidence for our hypothesized mechanism. Across the
different hypothesized relationships we examine, weighted
disclosure levels typically increase at a greater rate than
absolute disclosure, suggesting that as more damaging
firms are exposed to scrutiny and global norms, they
choose to disclose more substantive information.
Institutional Influences and Corporate Strategies
Our theory and findings promote a deeper understand-
ing of the multilevel factors that have an institutional
influence on firms’ symbolic strategies. Whereas prior
research has offered conflicting views as to whether firm
characteristics—such as environmental performance—that
lead to greater visibility are associated with more or
less institutional compliance (Greenwood et al. 2011),
our investigation sought to theorize specific mechanisms
associated with compliance and to develop multilevel tests
to better identify these mechanisms. Our investigation
of the effects of global norms and of different types
of scrutiny on selective disclosure examined not only
firm characteristics likely to be associated with these
mechanisms, but also the institutional environments that
lead to greater scrutiny of and normative pressure on
firms. By examining these relationships at different levels
of analysis and by exploring the interactions between
them, we can be more confident than prior researchers
were that our theorized processes—scrutiny and global
norms—lead firms to temper their selective disclosure.
Our multilevel investigation also enables us to the-
oretically and empirically distinguish distinct mecha-
nisms of scrutiny and of norm diffusion, which have
seldom been differentiated. For instance, prior research
examining country-level institutional environments has
stressed the importance of each of these mechanisms
but typically measured their aggregate effect via the
presence of international nongovernmental organizations
(INGO) or intergovernmental organization (IGO) (Tsutsui
and Wotipka 2004). In contrast, our study distinguished
scrutiny and normative mechanisms both theoretically
and empirically. Furthermore, research examining scrutiny
mechanisms has typically been conducted only in the U.S.
context, where the robustness of civil society is taken
for granted (Kim and Lyon 2011, 2015). By contrast,
we specify two key sources of scrutiny: environmental
NGO presence, which is a form of organized scrutiny
(King 2008), and civil liberties and political rights, which
represent more generally the potential for public voice.
Regarding norm diffusion mechanisms, we also hypothe-
sized and tested several factors that convey transparency
norms that lead firms to temper selective disclosure. These
factors are (a) civil society’s exposure to global informa-
tion in the headquarters country and (b) a firm’s direct
exposure to strong transparency norms through its foreign
stock exchange listing. Identifying and testing sources of
scrutiny and norm diffusion mechanisms are important
for understanding greenwashing in the global context
across different types of political and economic systems.
Furthermore, compared to the economic models of prior
researchers (Lyon and Maxwell 2011), our work provides
valuable empirical findings and illustrates how the real
social process unfolds. In conclusion, by emphasizing
several simultaneous mechanisms and processes that
temper selective disclosure, our approach contributes to
the institutional literature by providing a more nuanced
distinction between the different institutional pressures
that affect firms’ symbolic activities.
Contributions to Research on Information Disclosure
In addition to contributing to the understanding of selective
disclosure as a symbolic strategy, our research advances
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the broader research on information disclosure. This grow-
ing literature has examined the circumstances under which
companies voluntarily disclose environmental information
and the need for standards and third-party verification
to guide companies on what indicators and issues they
should report (e.g., Kolk 2004, Reid and Toffel 2009,
Lewis et al. 2014). Our paper adds an important dimension
to this literature by revealing the extent to which reported
information is or is not likely to be representative of a
company’s true environmental impact. Significantly, our
measurement of selective disclosure, which is a compari-
son of a firm’s symbolic transparency with its substantive
transparency, goes beyond prior literature that is focused
on one or the other (e.g., Kolk 2004, Marquis and Qian
2014, Short and Toffel 2008). Thus, we provide a novel
approach to understanding this form of organizational
symbolic activity. Furthermore, our conceptualization
of selective disclosure as a general corporate process
distinguishes our study from corporate environmentalism
studies that focus mainly on disclosure of environmental
indicators. As a result, our theory is more generalizable for
understanding other organizational disclosure processes
(Pfeffer 1981, Abrahamson and Park 1994). Thus, we
shift the conversation to a deeper understanding of com-
panies’ voluntary business strategies and encourage future
research along these lines to further unpack disclosure
practices and, more broadly, misleading communication.
Implications for Practice
The extent to which corporations accurately disclose
their social and environmental performance has important
practical implications for many market and nonmar-
ket stakeholders—ranging from corporate customers to
investors to NGOs and intergovernmental agencies such
as the United Nations—that rely on corporate environ-
mental reporting and transparency to assess environmental
performance. Our work reveals to these stakeholders a
constellation of organizational characteristics and institu-
tional features that predict when the disclosed information
is more likely to be symbolic or to be substantive.
These stakeholders and practitioners can put our results
to use in several ways. In circumstances where disclosed
information tends to be more symbolic, customers seeking
information about their existing and potential suppliers
and asset managers seeking information about companies
in which they are considering investing can bolster the
accuracy of such information by requiring independent
third-party validation. The failure to provide third-party-
validated information in such circumstances would signal
that a firm’s disclosures were more likely to be symbolic.
Whereas scholars have described the general merits of
third-party validation of corporate environmental and
social reports (Dando and Swift 2003), our work is, to our
knowledge, among the first to identify circumstances under
which deploying this practice would add the most value.
Understanding key levers that can promote more sub-
stantive disclosure is also important for domestic and
international actors such as activists and NGOs. By better
understanding which corporate environmental reports
are more likely to be symbolic, programs that guide
and encourage environmental disclosure—such as the
Global Reporting Initiative and the United Nations Global
Compact—can impose cost-effective requirements to pre-
serve their own integrity. For example, they could impose
strong validation requirements but exempt companies that
list their shares on exchanges with strong transparency
requirements or that are headquartered in countries more
connected to global civil society. For social movement
organizations, our environmental performance and foreign
exposure findings suggest that certain corporations, and
corporations in certain countries, may be more responsive
targets for institutional pressure.
Boundaries and Limitations
Many of our study’s limitations stem from its global
context. Given the difficulty of collecting reliable and
consistent firm-level variables for over 4,500 firms across
45 countries, some of our measures are more coarse than
they would likely be if we were examining a smaller set
of firms headquartered in a single country. For example,
we would have liked to be able to collect data on the
value of each firm’s sales to each country to examine
whether characteristics of its international customers might
affect selective disclosure, but we were unable to locate
such data for our broad international sample of firms.
We encourage future research to explore whether such
additional variables affect symbolic disclosure.
Whereas relying on archival data provides many advan-
tages, one disadvantage is that we cannot observe the
motivations that underlie firms’ environmental reporting
practices. Whereas our measure of selective disclosure
identifies the extent to which firms disproportionately
disclose their less-damaging environmental impacts, we
acknowledge that this activity might sometimes be
inadvertent—a result of limited management attention.
Still, the scrutiny and normative pressures we describe
ought to heighten that attention. If some selective disclo-
sure is indeed inadvertent, our estimates might under-
estimate the true hypothesized effects. Further research
based on qualitative methods or on survey data is needed
to distinguish the motives underlying firms’ symbolic
practices.
We also acknowledge the limitation of focusing on the
institutional features only of firms’ headquarters countries.
Whereas this is consistent with much of the literature
that explores institutional influences on multinational
corporations’ decision making, we acknowledge that
the institutional features of other contexts—such as the
countries to which firms sell the most—might also be
influential. We encourage future research to identify the
types of managerial decision that are influenced by firms’
various institutional contexts.
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Finally, although our theory is empirically supported
in our sample of large public firms, data limitations
prevented us from including private firms in our analyses.
Because private firms are less visible, we speculate that
they may be less likely to follow our predictions. We
acknowledge this limitation and encourage future research
to examine if type of ownership is a boundary condition
for our theory.
Conclusion
This study examines the extent to which characteristics that
enhance scrutiny and increase exposure to international
norms influence the practice of selective disclosure for
thousands of corporations across the institutional envi-
ronments of 45 nations. Our findings (a) suggest that
the global environmental movement affects corporate
environmental management practices and (b) highlight
several levers available to corporate customers, investors,
activists, and policy makers to improve firms’ environmen-
tal performance. We theorized how selective disclosure can
be influenced both by scrutiny and by diffusion of global
norms and how these processes operate through particu-
lar characteristics of organizations and their institutional
environments. In doing so, our approach highlights the
importance of considering multiple levels with large-scale
organizational data to examine how institutional processes
operate.
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Endnotes
1For several years, Newsweek magazine’s Green Rankings relied
on Trucost data to assess companies’ environmental impacts.
2The four-year window of our sample (2004–2007) was the
entire time period available when we bought the data in 2009.
Trucost provided four years of data from 2,811 firms, three
years from 655 firms, two years from 578 firms, and a single
year from 743 firms.
3We had fewer than five observations for firms headquartered
in Argentina, the British Virgin Islands, the Czech Republic,
Kuwait, Morocco, Puerto Rico, Slovenia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Zimbabwe. None of the companies headquartered
in the Cayman Islands, Egypt, Iceland, or Sri Lanka had any
disclosures.
4Nearly half the observations are of firms headquartered in
five countries of Anglo-American heritage: Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
As a robustness test of whether our results were driven by
firms headquartered in these countries, we re-estimated our
primary models on a subsample that excluded them. The results
continued to yield statistically significant coefficients on our
hypothesized variables of the same sign as our primary results,
providing evidence that the hypothesized relationships operate
well beyond those five countries.
5This formula results in selective disclosure magnitude equaling
0 when a firm’s absolute disclosure ratio equals its weighted dis-
closure ratio, which occurs when a firm discloses no indicators
(when both ratios equal 0), all of its indicators (when both ratios
equal 1), or when the ratios take on identical intermediate values.
Each of these scenarios represents the lack of misrepresenta-
tion. We also estimated our models on an alternative outcome
variable, a dichotomous variable indicating any evidence of
selective disclosure. Any selective disclosure was coded 0 if
there was no evidence of selective disclosure (that is, selective
disclosure magnitude was less than or equal to zero) and was
coded 1 if there was evidence of selective disclosure (that is,
selective disclosure magnitude was positive). These models,
estimated with logistic regression, continued to yield statistically
significant coefficients on all of our hypothesized variables
except that the coefficient on listed on a foreign stock exchange
x environmental damage continued to be negative but was no
longer statistically significant.
6Disclosures in our context refer only to companies publicly
reporting their firm-wide global emissions of particular sub-
stances in a given year. Reporting such global metrics is “almost
exclusively voluntary” (Salo 2012, p. 173), which mitigates
concerns that our results might be contaminated by differences
in regulatory reporting requirements, a much greater issue for
plant-level analyses because some regulatory regimes require
plants to report their annual emissions.
7This data-driven approach differs substantially from that of
most environmental, social, and governance rating agencies,
which instead tend to focus on a subset of indicators that
reflect the agency’s cultural norms, ideological preferences, and
competitive position vis-à-vis other rating agencies.
8Suppose Companies A and B are otherwise identical, but
Company A discloses only the 10 least damaging indicators out
of 20 and Company B discloses only the 10 most damaging
out of 20. They will have the same absolute disclosure ratio
because they have disclosed the same amount of information,
but Company B’s weighted disclosure ratio will be higher than
that of Company A, because Company B has disclosed more
important information.
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9For example, a steel manufacturer or cement producer that
discloses only its greenhouse gas emissions—the dominant envi-
ronmental impact in those highly energy-intensive industries—is
likely to have a low absolute disclosure ratio but a high weighted
disclosure ratio, resulting in a low selective disclosure magni-
tude. It is keeping a lot undisclosed but is disclosing the most
damaging indicator. In contrast, a mining company that discloses
most of its pollution released into the air, water, and land but
omits some or all of the most environmentally burdensome
pollutants in that industry (such as ammonia, arsenic, and
cyanide) will have a high absolute disclosure ratio but a lower
weighted disclosure ratio, resulting in a high selective disclosure
magnitude. It is disclosing many indicators but keeping the
most important ones undisclosed.
10A brief example is illustrative. Consider a railroad com-
pany whose activities, according to Trucost’s sophisticated
model, resulted in 27 pollutants. Suppose Trucost researchers
determined that the company publicly disclosed worldwide
quantitative figures for 22 of these 27 indicators. The company’s
absolute disclosure ratio will be 0.81 (calculated as 22/27),
a high value that suggests a great deal of environmental trans-
parency. Suppose further that Trucost’s model determined that
the environmental damage associated with these 22 indicators
constitutes just 51% of the company’s overall environmental
damage (that is, the company’s weighted disclosure ratio is 0.51)
and that the remaining 49% derives from the five relevant
indicators the company failed to disclose, which could be
ammonia, nitrous oxide, HFCs, methane, and total VOCs. The
company’s selective disclosure magnitude is 0.3, calculated as
absolute disclosure ratio minus weighted disclosure ratio (that is,
0081É 0051). This positive value indicates that the company
selectively disclosed in a manner that risks exaggerating its
environmental transparency because its disclosures focused on
its relatively benign environmental impacts.
11In other words, they represent the externalized costs of the
environmental degradation associated with each ton of natural
resource consumed and pollutant emitted. For example, Trucost
uses $31 as the environmental impact per ton of greenhouse gas
emitted (Trucost Plc. 2008, p. 5).
12We also attempted to develop measures in other relevant
institutional environments, such as the countries each company
was mostly reliant upon for sales, but were thwarted by data
unavailability. Therefore, we leave this to future research in
contexts where such measures exist.
13Freedom House, “Freedom in the world,” http://
www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world (accessed
March 12, 2010).
14Using the civil liberties score instead of the combined civil
liberties and political rights score yielded nearly identical
results. The two measures are very highly correlated.
15Firm headquarter countries’ regulatory environments might
differentially affect selective disclosure by firms in different
industries, particularly if the strength of civil society correlates
with regulatory requirements mandating some disclosure by
firms in more environmentally damaging industries. To assess
whether our results are robust to this possibility, we estimated
a model akin to Model 3 in Table 3 (which interacts civil
liberties and political rights with environmental damage) that
also included as additional controls interactions between two-
digit industry dummies and headquarter country dummies. This
alternative model yielded coefficients on our hypothesized
variables that are nearly identical in magnitude and significance
to those of our primary model, suggesting that our primary
results are robust to this concern.
16ETH Zürich, “KOF Index of Globalization,” Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology Zurich website, http://globalization
.kof.ethz.ch/ (accessed March 2010).
17Examples include country-specific lists, such as Fortune
magazine’s U.S.-oriented “100 Best Companies to Work For”
and Interbrand’s “Best Chinese Brands,” and global lists such
as Business Week’s “Top Innovative Companies in the World.”
18World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental
Law and Policy, and Columbia University Center for
International Earth Science Information Network, “2001
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI),” p. 244, http://sedac
.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/esi-environmental-sustainability
-index-2001 (accessed March 10, 2010).
19This index reflects (a) the freedom that journalists and the news
media actually possess and (b) government efforts to respect that
freedom, based on surveys on harms and threats to individual
journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, and physical attacks)
and to the news media (such as censorship and harassment).
Potential concerns about high correlation between press freedom
and civil liberties and political rights led us to conduct a
robustness test whereby we estimated our models without
controlling for press freedom. These alternative models yielded
results nearly identical to those of our primary models.
20Transparency International, “A short methodological note:
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
4CPI5 2008,” http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/cpi/2008; data at http://www.transparency.org
(both accessed March 12, 2010).
21U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research
Service, “Real GDP (2005 dollars) historical data set,”
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/
#HistoricalMacroTables (accessed March 12, 2010).
22To account for the possibility that a country’s progress toward
meeting its Kyoto Protocol target might influence selective
disclosure practices, we conducted robustness tests in which we
re-estimated our models by also controlling either for Kyoto
progress or for Ahead of Kyoto, which yielded results nearly
identical to those of our primary model. We created Kyoto
progress as a country-level variable calculated as the difference
between a Kyoto “Annex I” country’s actual emissions reduction
rate as of 2008 and the average annual reduction rate required
to meet its Kyoto target, coded with that value for all years
since the protocol entered into force, and coded 0 otherwise.
Among the countries in our sample, this ranged from Spain
exhibiting the largest shortfall (É2108%) to Norway exhibiting
the largest surplus beyond its target (17.6%). We created Ahead
of Kyoto as a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the country was
ahead of its target in the years after it was bound by its Kyoto
commitment, and 0 otherwise. We obtained data for these two
variables from European Environment Agency (2010).
23United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
“Kyoto Protocol status of ratification,” http://unfccc.int/
kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (accessed
July 2009).
24World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law
and Policy, and Columbia University Center for International
Earth Science Information Network, “2002 Environmental
Sustainability Index (ESI),” http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/
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data/set/esi-environmental-sustainability-index-2002 (accessed
March 10, 2010).
25Correlations are reported in Table 2.
26Environmental NGOs per million population was missing
for the 924 observations pertaining to Bermuda, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, and Taiwan; civil liberties and political rights for 808
observations (Bermuda, Hong Kong, South Korea); globalization
index for 845 (Bermuda, Hong Kong, Taiwan); intergovern-
mental environmental organizations for 929 (Bermuda, Hong
Kong, Luxembourg, Russia, Taiwan); press freedom for 122
(Bermuda, Luxembourg); per capita gross domestic product
for 74 (South Africa); accounting standards stringency for 652
(Bermuda, China, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Pakistan, Poland, Russia); and environmental stress for 1,052
(Bermuda, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Singapore, Taiwan).
27Mixed-effects models are particularly appropriate for analyzing
data that contain some variables whose unit of analysis is
nested within a more aggregated unit of analysis of other
variables; for example, when firm-level attributes are nested
within headquarter-country-level attributes (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal 2012, Bridwell-Mitchell and Lant 2014, Majumdar
and Bhattacharjee 2014).
28Lyon and Maxwell’s (2011) model predicts that the best and
worst environmental performers would greenwash less than
moderate performers. We estimated an exploratory model that
allowed for the possibility of a nonmonotonic relationship by
adding environmental damage squared to our direct model. The
results of this exploratory model continued to yield a negative
significant coefficient on environmental damage (b=É00042;
p < 0001) and also yielded a negative significant coefficient
on environmental damage squared 4b=É00041; p < 00015.
The results of this exploratory model and our primary model
both indicate that less selective disclosure is exhibited by
more environmentally damaging firms, which differs from the
prediction of the Lyon and Maxwell (2011) model. The nuance
revealed by the exploratory model is that the decline in selective
disclosure occurs at an accelerating pace as environmental
damage increases.
29This relationship is depicted in Figure 1, which graphs average
predicted values of selective disclosure magnitude from Model 2
estimated at varying levels of environmental performance.
30Figure 2 graphs average predicted values from Model 3.
31Figure 3 graphs average predicted values from Model 4.
32Figure 4 graphs average predicted values from Model 5.
33Specifically, these results indicate that a one-standard-deviation
increase in environmental damage is associated with a 35%
increase in absolute disclosure ratio and a 72% increase in
weighted disclosure ratio. The 35% increase is calculated by
dividing the 0.016 coefficient on environmental damage in
Model 1a by 0.046, the sample average of absolute disclosure
ratio, that model’s dependent variable. Similarly, the 72%
increase is calculated by dividing the 0.108 coefficient on
environmental damage in Model 1b by 0.149, the sample
average of weighted disclosure ratio, that model’s dependent
variable.
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